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Abstract
This study analyzes a two-sided search model in which agents are vertically hetero-
geneous and agents on one side do not know their own type. Agents with imperfect
self-knowledge update their beliefs based on the o¤ers or rejections they receive from
others. The results presented in this paper are as follows. An agent with imperfect self-
knowledge lowers his or her reservation level if the agent receives a rejection that leads
him or her to revise belief downward. However, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge
does not raise his or her reservation level even if the agent receives an o¤er that leads
to revise his or her belief upward. As a result, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge
has the highest reservation level when he or she has just entered the market, and then
a series of meetings gradually lowers his or her reservation level through the duration of
the search.
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1 Introduction
Many studies have examined individual search behavior with incomplete information (e.g.,
Rothschild (1974), Morgan (1985), Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), Bikhchandani and Sharma
(1996), and Adam (2001)). Most previous studies have focused on the uncertainty about mar-
ket conditions in terms of the shape of the wage distribution. The present study is related
to these works. However, this study focuses on agentsuncertainty about their own type.
Here, we introduce learning about ones own type in a two-sided search model and examine
the interaction between the marriage pattern (i.e., who marries whom) and learning in the
market equilibrium.1 In the literature on search, few studies have paid attention to imperfect
self-knowledge. In Gonzalez and Shi (2010), agents learn their own job-nding abilities by
observing the o¤ers or rejections from rms. In the directed search model with two types of
agents, authors show that learning from a search can induce both the desired wages (i.e., the
wage in the chosen submarket) and the reservation wages to decline with the unemployment
duration. By contrast, our model is a random two-sided search model.
We construct a model in which n types of searchers do not know their own type, but do
know the types of others. Then, they update their beliefs about their own type when they
receive o¤ers or rejections from others. For example, when searching for an employer, workers
are evaluated by employers on their types (abilities or skills) when they meet. If a worker is
young in terms of experience, his or her self-assessment is based on limited experience. By
contrast, employers may have considerable experience of evaluating workers. As a result, a
young worker learns something about his or her own type when he or she observes an o¤er or a
rejection from an employer.2 The feature of this study is that others have better information
on agents types than the agents do themselves. Similarly, when searching for a marriage
partner, a single agent is evaluated with regard to his or her marital charms by an agent of
the opposite sex. Young agents self-assessment will be based on their limited experience,
perhaps including height, age, academic achievement, and family background. However, an
agent of the opposite sex may be in a better position to assess a young agents charm than
the agent himself/herself because marital charm is determined by various elements such as
attraction, intelligence, height, age, education, income, position at work, social status, and
family background.3
We introduce learning about ones own type by using the framework of Burdett and Coles
(1997), which is a two-sided search model with complete information. Although our model
focuses on marriage, the ideas and techniques can be applied to other two-sided search frame-
works, such as the labor market, the housing market, and other markets where heterogeneous
1The idea of imperfect self-knowledge with learning is termed the looking-glass selfin sociology and social
psychology. The idea, attributed to Cooley (1902), is that people form their self-views by observing how others
treat them. Although this topic has received little attention in economics, recent studies have introduced the
idea of imperfect self-knowledge in the principal-agent model (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2003)).
2 If experienced workers search for a new job that is similar to their previous job, they may have a more
accurate self-assessment of their ability than thier potential employers. Such situations are not considered in
this study.
3Although marital charm comprises various elements, for simplicity, most studies assume it is one-
dimensional and scalar. Therefore, we adopt the same approach here.
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buyers and sellers search for the right trading partner. Here, we assume non-transferable util-
ity : there is no bargaining for the division of total utility. In the labor market, utility is
generally transferable. However, for example, when the worker is enthusiastic about a job
because of its location, or when the employer is attracted to the worker because of his or
her personality, their utilities can be considered to be non-transferable. Furthermore, if the
worker o¤ers to work for a reduced wage, this wage might be restricted by some lower bound
determined outside of the match, such as a legislated minimum wage or an industry-wide
union relationship (see Burdett and Wright (1998)). Therefore, when wages and all other
terms of the relationship are xed in advance, and there is nothing for the pair to negotiate
after they meet, their utilities can be viewed as being non-transferable utility.
The model is described as follows, using the marriage market interpretation. Single agents
are vertically heterogeneous; that is, there exists a ranking of marital charm (or types). Single
men or women enter the marriage market to search for a marital partner. An opponents
(inherent) type can instantly be recognized when a man and a woman meet. However, all
men know their actual types, whereas women who have just entered the marriage market do
not.4 Each agents optimal search strategy has a reservation-level property, that is, he or
she continues searching until meeting an agent of the opposite sex who is at least as good
as the predetermined threshold. This is termed the reservation level, which depends on
the agents search cost and the distribution of agentsbeliefs. A man and a woman marry
and leave the market if they meet and both propose. If at least one of the two decides not
to propose, they separate and continue to search for another partner. From these settings,
the marriage pattern in the market is determined: agents of either sex are partitioned into
clusters of marriages when sorting, which is a kind of positive assortative matching (PAM).5
The results presented in this paper show that because of the belief-updating process, a
woman rejects a man who she would accept if she had perfect self-knowledge. The belief-
updating process also induces a woman with imperfect self-knowledge to accept a man who
she would reject if she had perfect self-knowledge. As a result, marriages of all women with
imperfect self-knowledge, except the highest-type women, are delayed by their own learning.
Moreover, the existence of women with imperfect self-knowledge in the market lowers the
reservation level of all men, except the highest-type men, because womens learning delays
the marriages of these men.
This study also shows that a series of meetings gradually reduces the reservation level
of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge through the duration of the search. A woman
with imperfect self-knowledge lowers her reservation level when she receives a rejection that
has some information about her type. By contrast, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge
never raises her reservation level even if she receives an o¤er from a man. This is because a
higher o¤er results in a woman with imperfect self-knowledge getting married, as in Burdett
4 If all women know their own types and male entrants initially do not, qualitatively, the results remain the
same. The one-sided imperfect knowledge assumption makes it easier to determine the inuence of imperfect
self-knowledge than when neither party has perfect knowledge.
5PAM is said to hold if the types or marital charm of those who match are positively correlated (Becker
(1973)).
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and Vishwanath (1988). Moreover, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise
her reservation level even if she receives an o¤er that leads her to revise her belief upward.
The decision of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge whether to accept a man depends on
her decision after learning. Hence, a man, who will be rejected by her after her learning, is
also rejected by her before learning. Therefore, even if she updates her belief upward, her
reservation level does not rise. From these results, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge
has the highest reservation level when she has just entered the market.
The possible sources of declining reservation wages have received much attention in the
search literature (see Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). In particular, the sequence of the
reservation wage, which completely describes the behavior of agents when search is a sequen-
tial process, declines with the duration of the search (see Gronau (1971), Salop (1973), Sant
(1977), and Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). The inuence of the search duration on the
reservation wage is yet to be well understood in empirical studies.6 Several empirical studies
show that declining reservation wages are monotonic only when certain conditions on the
variables hold in the model (Kiefer and Neumann (1981), Lancaster (1985), Addison, Cen-
teno, and Portugal (2004), and Brown and Taylor (2009)). Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)
also show that when workers learn the unknown wage distribution, the reservation wage of
an unemployed worker declines with his or her unemployment spell in a search model. In
their model, the worker is employed when he or she receives a high o¤er. By contrast, the
worker perceives the jobs available to him or her as o¤ering low wages when he receives an
o¤er much lower than expected. Then, the worker revises his reservation wage downward.
Unlike their model, our model is a two-sided search model and agents know the distribution
of types but do not know their own types. Specically, in two-sided search models, receiving
an o¤er is likely to lead to an increase in the reservation level of an agent with imperfect
self-knowledge. However, our results show that an agent with imperfect self-knowledge does
not revise his or her reservation level upward when he or she receives an o¤er.
Few studies have paid attention to imperfect self-knowledge in the search literature. Gon-
zalez and Shi (2010), where agents learn their own job-nding abilities by observing the o¤ers
or rejections from rms, show that learning from search can cause the desired wages (the wage
in the chosen submarket) and reservation wages to decline with the unemployment duration.
Their model is the directed search model with two types of agents, in which the value function
of an unemployed worker strictly increases in the workers belief. This is because a workers
(or a rms) search decision is to choose the submarket to search. Hence, the reservation
wage strictly decreases over the search spell as the workers belief about his or her own abil-
ity becomes gradually worse. In contrast to their model, ours is a random two-sided search
model with two-sided imperfect self-knowledge. Agentstypes are n types and an agent with
imperfect self-knowledge decides the reservation utility by considering the composition of
each belief in the market and his or her future learning process fully. As a result, the value
function is not monotonic with respect to the agents belief.
6Generally, it is ambiguous as to whether declining reservation wages are monotonic. Furthermore, mea-
suring the e¤ect of the search duration on reservation wage is di¢ cult.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic frame-
work for our analysis. In Section 3, we assume that agents are rational, except that all
agents expect that the type distributions of each sex in the market and the distribution of
agents beliefs are constant through time. Under these settings, we characterize a search
equilibrium, for any given inow distributions of each sex. Moreover, we rst derive a per-
fect sorting equilibrium (PSE) as a benchmark case, in which only persons of the same type
marry under perfect self-knowledge. In Section 3.2, we introduce the concept of imperfect
self-knowledge. In Section 3.3, we investigate the properties of the reservation utility level
of an agent with imperfect self-knowledge. In Section 3.4, we characterize the PSE with
imperfect self-knowledge. At the search equilibrium, one can calculate the number and type
distribution of the agents who exit the market through marriage in each period. If outow
distribution and number who exit are equal to the inow distribution and the number who
enter the market, the distributions in the market become constant. Then, the steady state
equilibrium is derived in Section 3. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Basic framework
This section presents the basic framework for our analysis. Let us assume that there are a
large and equal number of single men and women, N , who participate in a marriage market.
Each agent in the market wants to marry an agent of the opposite sex.
Finding a marriage partner always involves a time cost. It is di¢ cult for agents to meet
someone of the opposite sex in the market. Let  denotes the arrival rate of agents of the
opposite sex faced by an agent of either sex, where  is the parameter of the Poisson process.7
Agents are ex ante heterogeneous and all agents have the same ranking for a potential
partner in the marriage market. Let x denotes the type (charm) of a single man or woman,
where x is a real number.
When both sexes meet, each agent can instantly recognize the opponents (innate) type
and decide whether to propose. For simplicity, we assume that both agents submit their
o¤ers or rejections simultaneously. If at least one of the two agents decides not to propose,
they return to the marriage market and search for another partner. If both agents propose,
they marry and leave the marriage market permanently.
All agents discount at rate r > 0, and both sexes are assumed to obtain zero utility ow
while they are single. However, if a couple marries, each partner obtains a utility ow equal
to the spouses type per unit of time. That is, utilities are non-transferable: there is no
bargaining for the division of the total marital utility. Furthermore, we assume that people
live forever and that there is no divorce.
Let dt denotes the number of new single men and women who enter the market in any
time interval dt. Let 	i (:) ; i = m;w; denote the type distribution of male (m) or female
7The constant returns to scale of the encounter function implies  =M (N;N) =N =M (1; 1). If all agents
are homogeneous, all encounters lead to a match. At this time, there is no di¤erence between the matching
function and encounter function. However, because agents are heterogeneous in this study, encounters do not
always lead to a match.
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entrants (w). For simplicity, we assume that 	i (:) is strictly increasing over the interval
[x
¯ i
; xi], where x¯ i
and xi indicate the inmum and supremum of its support, respectively, and
x
¯ i
> 0, for i = m;w.
Let Fm (:; t) denotes the type distribution of men in the market in period t. Similarly,
Fw (:; t) denotes the type distribution of women at t. If a man meets a woman at t, Fw (x; t)
denotes the probability that the womans type is no greater than x, whereas if a woman meets
a man at t, Fm (x; t) denotes the probability that the mans type is no greater than x.
To simplify our analysis, let us assume that there are n discrete types of men and women,
according to the level of charm.
Let xk=r denotes the (discounted) utility of marrying a k-type agent (k = 1; 2; : : : ; n). We
assume that x1 > x2 > : : : > xn > 0. That is, in any equilibrium, all agents want to marry a
1-type agent. Let ik, for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, denotes the share of k-type agents i (= m;w) in the
market, where
Pn
k=1 
i
k = 1.
3 Stationary environment
To investigate the inuence of imperfect self-knowledge on the behavior of all agents, we rst
explore the stationary environment. In Section 4, we explore the steady sate.
In this section, we assume that all agents believe that the market can be characterized by
a stationary type distribution of men and women (Fm; Fw), where Fi (x; t) = Fi (x) ; for all x
and all t, and for i = m;w: Let us assume that Fi has support [x¯ i
; xi]; for i = m;w.
We rst derive a search equilibrium with perfect self-knowledge, which is a benchmark,
in the next section.8 Later, we study a search equilibrium with imperfect self-knowledge
(i.e., agents do not perfectly know their own types) and compare the equilibrium with the
benchmark case.
3.1 Perfect self-knowledge Benchmark result
Given (Fm; Fw), we can dene the following search equilibrium with perfect self-knowledge.
Denition 1 Under perfect self-knowledge (i.e., all agents know their own types), given the
stationary distribution Fi (:), for i = m;w, a search equilibrium with perfect self-knowledge
requires that all agents maximize their expected discounted utilities.
In a search equilibrium, it is not necessarily true that the inow of agents into the mar-
ket equals the outow of agents. In Section 4, we identify (Fm; Fw) ; where the two ow
distributions are equal.
Moreover, to show the inuence of learning on the behavior of all agents, we restrict
our attention to the following equilibrium, which we use under perfect self-knowledge as a
benchmark.
Denition 2 In a perfect sorting equilibrium (PSE), only persons of the same type marry.
8Here, we consider the basic framework of Burdett and Coles (1997).
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We rst derive a search PSE. Given (Fm; Fw), all agents use stationary strategies, which
specify which agents of the opposite sex an agent will propose to if they meet. Hence, the
set of agents of the opposite sex who will propose to an agent of type x is well dened.
Let "m (x) denotes the share of men who propose to a woman with x, if they meet, and
let Fm (:jx) denotes the type distribution of these men. Hence, w (x) = "m (x) is the
rate at which a woman with x receives o¤ers. In a similar fashion, we dene Fw (:jx) and
m (x) = "w (x) for all x:
Let Vw (xk) denotes a k-type womans expected discounted lifetime utility when single.
Standard dynamic programming arguments imply that
Vw (xk) =
1
1+rdt

w (xk) dtE

max

xk
r ; Vw (xk)
	 jxk+ (1  w (xk) dt)Vw (xk)
where xk has the distribution Fm (:jxk). Manipulating this equation and letting dt! 0 yields
rVw (xk) = w (xk)E

max

xk
r ; Vw (xk)
	  Vw (xk) jxk : (1)
The strategy takes the form of a reservation match strategy a k-type woman will accept
a man on contact if and only if his type is at least as great as Rw (xk)  rVw (xk).
Since the situation is the same for men, the expected discounted lifetime utility of a single
k-type man, Vm (xk), satises
rVm (xk) = m (xk)E

max

xk
r ; Vm (xk)
	  Vm (xk) jxk : (2)
where xk has Fw (:jxk). From (2), we can obtain the reservation match strategy of a k-type
man Rm (xk)  rVm (xk).
In a search equilibrium, w (xk) and Fm (:jxk) must be consistent with the reservation
match strategy of men, described by (2). Similarly, the same is true for men.
In the equilibrium, all agents use a reservation rule. If a man will propose to a woman
with type x0, he will also propose to a woman with type x00 > x0. As a result of receiving at
least the same o¤ers, Vw (x00)  Vw (x0), symmetry implies that Vm (x00)  Vm (x0) : Hence, in
the equilibrium, the reservation strategies Ri (:) are nondecreasing, for i = m;w.
The next proposition shows that in a PSE, a k-type man, for k = 1; : : : ; n, only proposes
to women with the same type or higher, and rejects women with a lower type. Women do the
same. Consequently, k-type agents who marry within their group form a cluster of marriages
(cluster k) in a search PSE.
Proposition 1 Let us assume that all agents recognize their own types. There exists a PSE
if (a) xk+1 < Rm (xk)  
w
k xk
wk +r
 xk, for k = 1; : : : ; n   1 and Rm (xn)  
w
nxn
wn+r
 xn, and
(b) xk+1 < Rw (xk)  
m
k xk
mk +r
 xk for k = 1; : : : ; n  1; and Rw (xn)  
m
n xn
mn +r
 xn.9
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
9At this time, the boundary conditions are Rm (x1)  
w
1 x1
w1 +r
< x1, Rw (x1)  
m
1 x1
m1 +r
< x1, Rm (xn) 
mn xn
mn +r
 xn, and Rw (xn)  
m
n xn
mn +r
 xn.
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Proposition 1 implies that with constant , an k-type agent rejects k + 1-type opposite
sex agents if the share of k-type agents of the opposite sex is su¢ ciently large or if the
di¤erence between xk and xk+1 is su¢ ciently large that they satisfy xk+1 < Ri (xk), for
i; j = m;w. Conversely, a k-type agent accepts a k + 1-type opposite sex agent if there
are su¢ ciently few k-type opposite sex agents, or if (xk   xk+1) is su¢ ciently small that
xk+1  Ri (xk). If Ri (xk)  xn; k = 1; : : : ; n, all agents obtain the same expected discounted
utility: Vi (x1) = : : : = Vi (xn)  xnr , i = m;w.
If r = 0, xk+1 < Ri (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n   1, and i = m;w. Therefore, the equilibrium
is the PSE when r = 0.
To clarify the inuence of learning on a market, in the following sections, we assume
that (Fm; Fw) and xk are common across equilibria and that the conditions in Proposition
1 are satised: xk  Ri (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n, and i = m;w.10 This restriction and the
assumption of n discrete types simplify the analysis. In Burdett and Coles (1997), where
agentstypes are continuous, agents of either sex are partitioned into n classes when sorting,
which is a kind of PAM, under perfect self-knowledge. Even if agentstypes are discrete, men
and women can be partitioned into some classes by the reservation levels of the opposite sex
agents, similar to Burdett and Coles (1997). The restriction Ri (xk)  xk ensures that the
equilibrium under perfect self-knowledge leads to PAM instead of classes, as in Burdett and
Coles (1997). In other words, type equals classwhen agentstypes are discrete under
perfect self-knowledge. Thus, the reservation level of k-type agents determines the k-th type
agents of the opposite sex.
In the model with learning, more partitions are generated than those under perfect self-
knowledge.
3.2 Imperfect self-knowledge
Let us assume that all men know their (innate) types, whereas no women know their types
when they have just entered the marriage market.11 Then, a woman with imperfect self-
knowledge (i.e., she does not perfectly know her own type) has a belief about her own
type. This one-sided imperfect knowledge assumption makes the inuence of imperfect self-
knowledge clearer than if we assume two-sided imperfect knowledge.12 We discuss this in
detail in Section 5.
At the start of period t = 0; 1; : : : ; t, a j-type woman with imperfect self-knowledge meets
a man randomly, j = 1; : : : ; n. Both sexes can instantly recognize the innate type of an agent
10For the other parameter ranges, it is di¢ cult to show the indirect e¤ect (indirect externality) of the
learning process. We discuss this in detail in Appendix B.
11Even if all women know their own types and no men initially know their types, the results are essentially
the same.
12This one-sided imperfect self-knowledge assumption describes the provided situations as follows. In the
context of the labor market, a rm has more information about its own type than a worker does, because the
rm will generally have more experience than the worker. In the context of the marriage market, when more
men work outside the home than women do, it is easier for men than for women to obtain objective data on
their own level of charm, such as income, position at work, and social status.
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of the opposite sex when they meet.13 For simplicity, we assume that a man need not know
the belief (or history) of a woman who he meets.14 They simultaneously submit their o¤ers
or rejections.15 If they separate, the woman updates her belief about her own type, and
therefore, she also revises her reservation level. Then, she searches for another partner.
Let otm (xj) 2 O = fo; o g denotes the action of an opponent (i.e., a man) observed by
a j-type woman as a result of a search outcome in period t, where O is the action set. If
she observes search outcome
 
xtk; o

, she knows that the k-type man accepted her. If she
observes
 
xtk; o
 , she knows that the k-type man rejected her. In this study, we use the
term actionto distinguish this from the reservation strategy.Specically, in our model
with discrete types, even if an agent lowers his or her own reservation strategy, this does not
guarantee that he or she accepts an agent of the opposite sex who he or she has previously
rejected. Therefore, in the following analysis, a change in an agents action means a change
in the types of agents of the opposite sex he or she is willing to accept.
Let assume that [xb; xa] for a < b is a set of types a woman believes she may belong to
before observing
 
xtk; o
t
m (xj)

at t. Let a;b 2 ([xb; xa]) denotes this womans belief about
her own type, where ([xb; xa]) is a set of probability distributions over [xb; xa]. The prior
belief is 0 2 ([x¯w; xw]). Furthermore, we assume that 0 is the type distribution of new
female entrants, 	w (:).16 Since 	w (:) is common knowledge, 0 is the same distribution
for all women. Moreover, let a;b (xj) denotes the probability that a woman with belief a;b
assigns herself to a particular type xj 2 [xb; xa]. This probability is determined by using
Bayesrule given 0.
Since mens strategies have the reservation-level property, a proposal or rejection from a
man provides a woman with information indicating that she does not belong to a particular
set of types of women. If a woman with a;b observes (xk; o), this o¤er informs her that her
type does not belong to [x
¯w
; Rm (xk)). Let xd(k) denotes an inmum type of women to whom
a k-type man proposes, i.e., Rm (xk)  xd. Therefore, she updates her belief to a;d(k). If
xd(k)  xb, her belief remains a;b. The case of xd(k) > xa is ruled out because all agents are
rational in this paper.
By contrast, if she observes (xk; o ), she know that her type does not belong to [xd(k); xw].
Hence, she changes her belief to d(k)+1;b for xa  xd(k)+1  xb. If xa < xd(k)+1, her belief
remains a;b. The case of xb > xd(k)+1 is also ruled out because all agents are rational.
Generally, the womans posterior belief, a0;b0 (xj), after observing
 
xk; o
t
m (xj)

in a period
13A woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not know whether she is accepted by a man she meets before
observing his action because of her imperfect self-knowledge. However, she can instantly recognize his actual
type.
14 In other words, we assume that a man does not regard the history of a woman whom he meets as a bad
or good signal because men know that all women learn about their own types through meetings. If a man
rejected a woman because of her long search duration, her learning would be delayed.
15 If a man can instantly recognize the belief of a woman when they meet, he can know her action (i.e.,
whether she proposes) before observing it. Thus, results similar to those of our study can also be obtained
in the case of a sequential move in which a woman proposes to a man in the rst move, and he proposes or
rejects her in the next move.
16Gonzalez and Shi (2010) assume that the initial expectation of the ability of a new worker depends on the
distribution of new workers over the levels of ability.
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is given by17
a0;b0 (xj) =
a;b(xj) Pr((xk;otm(xj))jxj)Pa
j=b a;b(xj)Pr((xk;otm(xj))jxj) : (3)
From these settings, a womans belief can be interpreted as history up to, but not includ-
ing, the search outcome in the period.18
All agents understand (Fm; Fw). However, now, there are di¤erent kinds of women with
di¤erent beliefs, even if they belong to the same type. Because we consider n types of agents,
a woman believes she may belong to each of the following sets of types: [xn; x1] ; [xn 1; x1] ; : : : ;
[x1; x1] ; [xn; x2]; [xn 1; x2]; : : : ; [x2; x2]; [xn; x3]; [xn 1; x3]; : : : ; [x3; x3]; : : : ; [xn; xn 1]; [xn 1; xn 1];
and [xn; xn]. Because the number of these sets is
n(1+n)
2 , the number of beliefs,
l, is nite
and becomes at most n(1+n)2 . Then, the number of reservation utility levels of women in the
market is at most n(1+n)2 .
Let xa;bj denotes a state of a woman, whose type is xj , and who has belief a;b. Let Gm (:)
and Gw (:) denote the stationary distribution of mens and womens states, respectively. Let
us suppose that any xa;bj > 0 is a real number and belongs to [x¯ i
; xi] and that Gi (:) is strictly
increasing over the interval [x
¯ i
; xi]; i = m;w. (We dene Gi (:) more precisely later.) Let
gw

xa;bj

denotes the probability mass function of states.
Let us assume that all agents believe the market is characterized by (Gm; Gw; 0) (we
later show that, at the steady state, Gm (:) and Gw (:) depend on Fi (:) ; i = m;w, which are
common knowledge). Since all men know their own types, Gm (:) = Fm (:).
Given (Gm; Gw; 0), all men use stationary strategies, where a strategy is a list of women
to whom a k-type man will propose when they meet. By contrast, all women with imperfect
self-knowledge use stationary strategies in the sense that a strategy is a list of men to whom
a woman with a;b will propose when they meet in period dt.
Let "m (xj) denotes the share of men who propose to a j-type woman, if they meet, and
let Fm (:jxj) denotes the type distribution of these men. Hence, w (xj) = "m (xj) is the
rate at which a j-type woman receives o¤ers. By contrast, let "w (xk) denotes the share of
women who propose to a k-type man, if they meet, and let Gw (:jxk) denotes the distribution
of the states of these women. Hence, m (xk) = "w (xk) is the rate at which a k-type man
receives o¤ers.
Let Vm (xk) denotes a k-type mans expected discounted lifetime utility when single.
Standard dynamic programming arguments imply that
Vm (xk) =
1
1+rdt

m (xk) dtE

max

xa;bj
r ; Vm (xk)

jxk

+ (1  m (xk) dt)Vm (xk)

where xa;bj has distribution Gw (:jxk). However, when a couple marries, each agent obtains
a utility ow equal to the spouses actual type, namely, xj . Manipulating this equation and
17Since we only consider pure strategies when self-knowledge is perfect in our model, Pr ((~xk; am (xk)) jxk) =
0 or 1 when a k-type woman observes (~xk; am (xk)), given the strategies of men.
18The set of types a woman believes she may belong to, [xb; xa]  [x¯w; xw]; for any a; b; can also be interpretedas an information set in a sequential-move game.
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letting dt! 0 yields
rVm (xk) = m (xk)E

max

xa;bj
r ; Vm (xk)

jxk

  Vm (xk)

: (4)
A k-type man will accept a woman on contact if and only if her type is at least as great as
Rm (xk)  rVm (xk).
By contrast, women with the same beliefs face the same decision problem, regardless of
their own types. Hence, the lifetime expected discounted utility of a woman with a;b in a
period dt, Vw
 
a;b

, satises
rVw
 
a;b

=
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)Vw
 
xj ja;b

= 11+rdt
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)
2664
(1  dt)Vw
 
a;b

+ (  w (xa)) dt
 
Vw
 
a;b

+(w (xa)  w (xj)) dt

Vw

d(k)+1;b

+w (xj) dtE

max
n
xk
r ; Vw

a;d(k)
o
3775 ;
where bj=aa;b (xj) = 1, and xk has Fm (:jxj). In the above equation, the second term
means that if a woman with a;b meets a man who rejects an a-type woman with probability,
(  w (xa)), she does not update her belief. This is because she has already met another
man with x0 who has xa < Rm (x0)  xa 1 in the past.19 The third term means that if a
j( a)-type woman meets a k-type man who accepts a j 1-type woman but rejects a j-type
woman, she updates her belief to d(k)+1;b.
20 In the fourth term, if a woman with xa;bj rejects
a k-type man, who accepts her, she updates her belief to a;d(k): However, if xd(k)  xb, her
belief remains a;b in the next period.
Manipulating the above equation and letting dt! 0 yields
rVw
 
a;b

=
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)
24 (w (xa)  w (xj))Vw d(k)+1;b  Vw  a;b
+w (xj)

Emax
n
xk
r ; Vw

a;d(k)
o
  Vw
 
a;b

35 : (5)
A woman with a;b marries a man after contact if and only if his type is at least as great as
Rw
 
a;b
  rVw  a;b.
In an equilibrium, w (xj) and Fm (:jxj) must be consistent with the reservation match
strategy of men, described by (4). Similarly, for men, m (xk) and Gw (:jxk) must be consis-
tent with the reservation match strategy of women, described by (5).
Equilibrium means that the reservation strategies Rm (:) are nondecreasing. If a woman
will propose to a man with type x0, she will also propose to a man with type x00 > x0. As
a result of receiving at least the same o¤ers, Vm (x00)  Vm (x0). Hence, Rm (x00)  Rm (x0).
From this, d (k) is not decreasing in k. By contrast, whether Rw(a;b) are decreasing or
19For a man with x > x0, Rm (x)  Rm (x0). Hence, if a woman with a;b meets a man with x  x0, she
does not update her belief.
20From Gm (:) = Fm (:), w (xa)  w (xj) for xa > xj .
11
increasing is not obvious, because a;b is a distribution, not a real number. However, as any
man who wants to marry a woman with x0 also wants to marry a woman with x00 > x0,
Vw
 
x00ja;b
  Vw  x0ja;b holds, for any a;b and x0; x00 2 [xb; xa].
Although whether Rw
 
a;b

are decreasing or increasing is not obvious, the order of
the values of Rw
 
a;b

partitions men into classes. By using this, we can dene Gw (:)
more precisely. Let us order all women according to the type xj and values of Rw
 
a;b

.
When Rw
 
a;b
  Rw  a0;b0  : : :  Rw  a
¯
;b
¯

, we label the intervals as I1 = [xb; xa],
I2 = [xb0 ; xa0 ] ; : : :, Il = [xb¯
; xa
¯
].21 Then, l 2 (Il) for l = 1; 2; : : : ; l. Let xlk denotes a
k-type woman with l. Hence, we make the following assumption;
Assumption A.1. When Rw
 
a;b
  Rw  a0;b0  : : :  Rw  a
¯
;b
¯

, I1 = [xb; xa],
I2 = [xb0 ; xa0 ] ; : : :, Il = [xb¯
; xa
¯
]. We assume that x1a > x
1
a+1 > : : : > x
1
b
> x2a0 > x
2
a0+1 > : : : >
x2b0 > : : : > x
l
a
¯
> x
l
a
¯
+1 > : : : > x
l
b
¯
> 0 only for Gw (:) and gw (:).
From this assumption, the distribution Gw (:) is strictly increasing over the interval
[x
l
b
¯
; x1a]. Let 
l
j 2 [0; 1]; l = 1; 2; : : : ; l; denotes the share of women with l 2 (Il) of the
j-type women, where
Pl
l=1 
l
j = 1, for any j. From this, gw

xlj

= lj
w
j , for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
denotes the share of j-type women with l.
When Rw
 
a;b
  xk, given the best reservation match strategy, equation (5) can be
rewritten. Let x~s(j) denotes the highest type of men who accepts a j-type woman. Then, a
man with x  x~s(j) 1 rejects a j-type woman. From Vm (x00)  Vm (x0), for x00 > x0, s (j) is not
decreasing in j. Generally, the arrival rate of proposals of a woman with xj , for any j ( a),
becomes w (xj) = ~ni=s(j)
m
i , w (xa)   w (xj) = s(j) 1i=a mi , and Fm (:jxj) = F (:)n
i=s(j)
mi
.
Hence, if Rw
 
a;b
  xk, Rm (xk)  xd and d (k) < b, then the reservation match strategy of
a woman with a;b can be rewritten as
rVw
 
a;b

=
d(k)X
j=a
a;b (xj)
2666664
(w (xa)  w (xj))

Vw

d(i)+1;b

  Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ki=~s(j)
mi
~n
i=~s(j)
mi
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ni=k+1
mi
~n
i=~s(j)
mi

Vw

a;d(i)

  Vw
 
a;b

3777775
+
bX
j=d(k)+1
a;b (xj)
264 (w (xa)  w (xj))

Vw

d(i)+1;b

  Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ni=~s(j)
mi
n
i=~s(j)
mi

Vw

a;d(i)

  Vw
 
a;b

375 :(6)
where Vw

a;d(i)

= Vw
 
a;b

, for i such that xd(i)  xb.
If d (k)  b; a woman with a;b does not update her belief after meeting a k-type or lower
type man. At this time, by substituting d(i) = b, for i = k; : : : ; n into (5), we obtain
rVw
 
a;b

=
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)
264 (w (xa)  w (xj))

Vw

d(i)+1;b

  Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ki=~s(j)
mi
~n
i=~s(j)
mi
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;b

375 : (7)
21 If Rw
 
a;b

= Rw
 
a0;b0

, let Il0 = [xb0 ; xa0 ] and Il0+1 =

xb00 ; xa00

.
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Equations (6) and (7) describe the reservation match strategies of a woman with a;b,
given the expected rate of proposals by men.
To simplify the analysis, we make the following assumption;
Assumption A.2. Men and women are partitioned into n classes by the reservation
levels of the opposite sex agents, in Sections 3.3-4.22
Assumption A.2. guarantees that typeequals classunder imperfect self-knowledge.
Therefore, the reservation level of a k-type man is a partition that determines the k-th type
of women. By contrast, let Rw
 
lk

= Rw

a00 ;b00

such that xk  Rw
 
a0;b0
  : : : 
Rw

a00 ;b00

> xk+1, for any k. That is, Rw
 
lk

is a partition that determines the k-th
type (or class) of men. Then, we can re write Rw
 
a0;b0

as Rw

lk 1+1

, for any k, where
l0 + 1 = 1. Because a woman with l, for l = lk 1 + 1; lk 1 + 2; : : : ; l; accepts a k-type man,
the equation (4) can be rewritten as
rVm (xk) = m (xk)
Rm(xk)X
j=1
Pl
l=lk 1+1 gw(x
l
j)
Gw(:jxk)
 xj
r   Vm (xk)

; (8)
where
Pl
l=lk 1+1 gw

xlj

is the share of j-type women who accept a k-type man.
Assumption A.2 also ensures that a man proposes to a woman of the same type because
there are n types of agents. Hence, xk+1 < Rm (xk) ; for k = 1; : : : ; n, d (k) = k and s (j) = j.
However, Assumption A.2 does not require that a woman proposes to a man of the same type
under imperfect self-knowledge.
In the next section, we investigate the characteristics of the reservation utility level of
agents with imperfect self-knowledge before we derive an equilibrium under imperfect self-
knowledge.
3.3 Analysis of the reservation utility level
The following lemmas hold for the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge.
The rst lemma shows that a woman with a;k rejects a k + 1-type man.
Lemma 1 Suppose that xk+1 < Ri (xk), for i = m;w and k = 1; : : : ; n. At this time,
Rw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1, for any a (1  a  k).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The next lemma shows that the decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type
man depends on that of a woman with a;k.
22More generally, if men are partitioned into n0 types by the reservation levels of women, n0 kinds of
reservation levels of men are generated. Then, because of discrete types of agents, women are always partitioned
into n ( n0) types by the reservation levels of men.
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Lemma 2 The decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type man, for any
k 2 fa+1; : : : ; bg, depends on whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

. If and only if Rw
 
a;b

> xk0,
then Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0. At this time, Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 holds. Moreover,
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b

= : : : = Rw
 
a;n

> xk0 ; (9)
holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2 implies that if a woman with a;b can update her belief to a;k0 (k
0 < b) after a
meeting, the decision of a woman with a;b depends on that of a woman with a;k0 . Hence,
given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 , the strategy of a woman with a;b becomes the same as that of a
woman with a;k0 .
Moreover, given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 , a woman with a;i rejects a i + 1-type man, for i =
a+ 1; : : : ; k0   1, and a woman with a;i, for i = k0; : : : ; n, rejects a k0-type man. Note that,
when k0 = b, a woman with a;b learns nothing from a meeting with a k0-type man.
The next lemma shows that the reservation level of a woman with a;b+1 is lower than or
equal to that of a woman with a;b, for any b ( a) :
Lemma 3 Let us assume that Ri (xk) > xk+1; i = m;w. For any a (= 1; : : : ; n  l   1) ;and
l(= 0; : : : ; n  (a+ 1)),
R
 
a;a+l
  R  a;a+l+1 : (10)
Proof. See, Appendix A.2.
Moreover, the next lemma also holds.
Lemma 4 A woman with a;b; for any a; b (a < b) ; has higher reservation level than that of
a woman with a+1;b; i.e.,
Rw
 
a;b

> Rw
 
a+1;b

:
Proof. See, Appendix A.2.
Lemma 4 means that the reservation level of a woman with a;b is higher than or equal
to that of a woman with a+1;b:
From Lemmas 2 and 4, we obtain the next proposition.
Proposition 2 A woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise her reservation utility
level even if she receives an o¤er that has information about her type. Thus, Rw (0) is the
highest reservation level of women in equilibrium.
Proof. See, Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 means that if a woman with a;b rejects a k + 1-type man but accepts a
k-type man, a woman with a;i, i = k + 1; : : : ; n; also rejects a k + 1-type man but accepts
a k-type man. Then, a woman with a;i, i = k + 1; : : : ; n, cannot be a woman with a;k0 ; for
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any k0  k. That is, a woman with a;i accepts a k-type man without having an opportunity
to revise her belief upward.
Moreover, even if a woman with imperfect self-knowledge can revise her belief upward,
she does not raise her reservation level. The decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept
a k+1-type man becomes the same as that of a woman with a;k+1. If a woman with a;k+1
rejects a k+ 1-type man, a woman with a;b also rejects a k+ 1-type man and then updates
her belief to a;k+1. In other words, she previousely rejects a man whom she will reject after
an upward belief revision. As a result, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise
her reservation level.23
Note that although Proposition 2 holds under Assumption A.2., Proposition 2 does not
require a womans PSEI actions, which we dene in the next section. Moreover, results
similar to those in this section can be obtained in the case of a one-sided search model, where
xk+1 < Rm (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n, are given and mens strategies are una¤ected by womens
strategies.
3.4 Search equilibrium with imperfect self-knowledge
Next, we introduce an equilibrium concept for this section. Although a womans state changes
over time, we rst focus on the market in a stationary environment.
Denition 3 In a search equilibrium under (one-sided) imperfect self-knowledge (SEI):
Given (Gm; Gw; 0),
(SEI-i) all men maximize their expected discounted utilities,
(SEI-i) all womens strategies satisfy sequential rationality, and
(SEI-ii) womens beliefs along the equilibrium path are consistent with Bayesian updating
given the equilibrium strategies.
By characterizing a search equilibrium for (Gm; Gw; 0), Section 4 identies (Gm; Gw; 0),
which implies that the two ow distributions are equal.
First, we derive a perfect sorting SEI (PSEI), where agents of the same type marry.
Therefore, the PSEI requires that a woman with a;b, proposes to a-type men, and always
rejects men of a lower type. Otherwise, the PSEI does not occur because men and women of
di¤erent types marry.
Although one can consider many combinations of agentsequilibrium strategies, we focus
on the PSEI in this study. This is because the inuence of learning on the market becomes
clearer by comparing the PSE with the PSEI. Moreover, from Proposition 2, Rw (0) is the
highest reservation level of women in an equilibrium. Hence, the opportunities of womens
learning are maximized in the PSEI.
23Even in the case of a sequential move in which a man proposes to a woman in the rst move, and she
proposes or rejects him in the next move, the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does
not rise. In this case, a woman can learn before marriage. However, she previously rejects a man whom she
rejects after revising her belief.
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Given the PSEI actions, a woman learns about her own type at most n  1 times. Here,
we term a ka;b-type woman and a k-type woman as a woman with x
a;b
k and a woman
with xk and with any belief, respectively.
The next proposition shows that there exists a unique PSEI, where agents partition
themselves into n clusters of marriages and, therefore, only men and women of the same type
marry.
Proposition 3 We assume that xk+1 < Ri (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n  1; and i = m;w. There
is a PSEI if, for k = 1; : : : ; n  1,
Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

= 
k;k+1(xk)
m
k (xk)+k;k+1(xk+1)
m
k (Rw(k+1;k+1))
(r+mk )
> xk+1; (11)
Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
= Ri (xk) > xk+1;
and if, for k = 1; : : : ; n  1,
Rm (xk) =

PRm(xk)
j=k
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
j)xj
r+
PRm(xk)
j=k
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
j)
> xk+1: (12)
In the PSEI, agents of the same type marry.
Proof of Proposition 3. We derive the desirable results by establishing the following lem-
mas.
First, we investigate the optimal strategies of women. We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If Rw
 
k;k+1

= 
k;k+1(xk)
m
k (xk)+k;k+1(xk+1)
m
k (Rw(k+1;k+1))
(r+mk )
> xk+1; a woman
with k;k+1 rejects a k + 1-type man, where xn+1 x¯ i; i = m;w. In the PSEI, Rw
 
k;k

>
Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

> xk+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n. Moreover, Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
=
Rw (xk) > xk+1 holds.
Proof of Lemma 5: First, let us investigate the decision of a woman with k;k, for k =
1; : : : ; n.
For k = 1, the arrival rate of proposals to a 1-type woman becomes w (x1) =  from
Fm (:jx1) = Fm (:). Then, rVw
 
1;1

= m1
 
x1
r   V
 
1;1

. Hence, Rw
 
1;1

=
m1 x1
r+m1
=
Rw (x1) > x2.
The arrival rate of proposals to a woman with xk, for k = 2; : : : n; becomes w (xk) =
Fm([xk 1; x1] ), which is the rate at which she meets men who accepts her. Given a random
contact, Fm (:jxk) = Fm(:)Fm([xk 1;x1] ) . From Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1, we have
rVw
 
k;k

= Fm([xk 1; x1] )
mk (
xk
r
 V (k;k))
Fm([xk 1;x1] )
:
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Then,
Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
= Rw (xk) > xk+1: (13)
Next, we investigate the decision of a woman with k;k+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n  1. From (6),
we have
rVw
 
k;k+1

= k;k+1 (xk)

mk
 
xk
r   Vw
 
k;k+1

+ mk+1
 
max
xk+1
r ; Vw
 
k;k+1
	  Vw  k;k+1
+k;k+1 (xk+1)

mk
 
Vw
 
k+1;k+1
  Vw  k;k+1+ mk+1  maxxk+1r ; Vw  k;k+1	  Vw  k;k+1 :
The rst term in the second square bracket in the above equation means that, if a woman
with k;k+1 is actually a k+1-type, she learns that she is the k+1-type by meeting a k-type
man. Thus,
Rw
 
k;k+1

= 
k;k+1(xk)
m
k (xk)+k;k+1(xk+1)
m
k (Rw(k+1;k+1))
(r+mk )
> ()xk+1: (14)
From (14), Rw
 
k;k+1

is uniquely obtained. In the PSEI, xk+1 < Rw
 
k;k+1

holds, for
k = 1; : : : ; n. Then, from Lemmas 2 and 3, Rw
 
k;k

> Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

>
xk+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n.
Lemma 5 shows that a woman with k;k+1 (k = 1; ::; n 1) rejects a k+1-type man if there
are su¢ cient k-type men or if k;k+1 (xk) is su¢ ciently large and satises xk+1 < Rw
 
k;k+1

.
If there are su¢ cient k + 1-type men, a woman with k+1;k+1 raises her reservation level.
Hence, a woman with k;k+1 also raises her reservation level because they may be women
with k+1;k+1 in the next period. Thus, more optimistic prior beliefs lead more women to
reject men who they would marry under perfect self-knowledge.
Women with imperfect self-knowledge assign probabilities to their own types. Therefore,
the reservation levels of the kk;b-type, for k = 1; ::; b 1, women are lowered in comparison with
the benchmark results. By contrast, the reservation levels of ik;b-type, for i = k+1; : : : ; b 1,
women are increased in comparison to the PSE.
Moreover, the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge increases as the
parameter  increases. This is because an increasing arrival rate of men speeds her learning
process and decreases the search duration.
When r = 0, Rw
 
k;k+1

= Rw (xk) (= xk) holds. Therefore, a woman with k;k+1 always
prefers to meet a k-type man over accepting a k + 1-type man in order to conrm her type.
This is because, if a woman with k;k+1 is actually a k+1-type, she would marry a k+1-type
man sooner or later, regardless of her action. Hence, the possibility that she is a k + 1-
type woman does not a¤ect her own decision because there is no time cost. Consequently,
the decision of a woman with k;k+1 is the same as that of a k-type woman with perfect
self-knowledge.
Next, we investigate the optimal strategies of men and marriage formation. Hence, we
obtain the following lemma.
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Lemma 6 A 1-type man rejects a 2-type woman because Rm (x1) = Rm (x1) > x2. If Rm (xk) =

Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)xk
r+
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)
> xk+1, for k = 2; : : : ; n  1; a k-type man rejects a k + 1-type woman,
where xn+1 x¯ i; i = m;w. The reservation level of a k-type man in the PSEI decreases in
comparison with the benchmark result, that is, Rm (xk) > Rm (xk).
Proof of Lemma 6: From Lemma 5, xk  Rw
 
k;k

> Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

> xk+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n, in the PSEI. Hence, Rw
 
lk

= Rw
 
k;n

and Rw

lk 1+1

=
Rw
 
k;k

, where Rw
 
lk

denotes a partition that determines the k-th type of men, for
k = 1; : : : ; n.
Since all women want to marry the most desirable men, i.e., x1 if they meet, m (x1) =
 and Gw (:jx1) = Gw (:). Hence, we have
Rm (x1) = 
Rm(x1)X
j=1
wj
 xj
r   Vm (x1)

= Rm (x1) :
A man with x1 accepts (rejects) a woman with x  (<)Rm (x1). From Rm (x1) > x2;
Rm (x1) > x2: Then, men with x1 and women with x1 form cluster 1.
Next, let us consider all men not in cluster 1. In the PSEI, l1 = [xn; x1]. From Assumption
A.1., his arrival rate of proposals becomes m (x2) = Gw([xl1n ; x
1
1]
 ) which is the rate at
which he meets women who accept him. The state distribution among such women implies
Gw (:jx2) = G (:) =Gw([xl1n ; x11] ). Therefore, the reservation level of a man with x2 becomes
Rm (x2) = Gw([x
l1
n ; x
1
1]
 )
Rm(x2)X
j=2
Pl
l=l1+1
gw(xlj)
Gw([x
l1
n ;x
1
1]
 )
 xj
r   Vm (x2)

= 
lX
l=l1+1
gw

xl2
  
x2
r   Vm (x2)

:
In the PSEI, x2  Rw
 
l1+1

= Rw
 
2;2

. A man with x2 proposes to any woman with
x  Rm (x2), so will all men not in cluster 1. In the PSEI, x2  Rm (x2) > x3. Then,
Rm (x2) =

Pl
l=l1+1
gw(xl2)x2
r+
Pl
l=l1+1
gw(xl2)
:
In the PSEI, intervals Il; for l = l1+1; : : : ; l, do not include x1. Moreover,
Pl
l=l1+1
l2
w
2 < 1,
from gw
 
xl2

= l2
w
2 . Thus, Rm (x2)  Rm (x2).
Some women with x2 reject men with x2, because these women have the same as or
higher reservation levels than Rw
 
l1

. Therefore, men with x2 and women with xl2, for
l = l1 + 1; : : : ; l; form cluster 2.
Similarly, we can consider a man in cluster 3. Therefore, in a similar fashion, cluster n
can be constructed, where Rm (xn)  xn. Generally, from (8), the reservation level of a man
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with xk; for any k = 1; : : : ; n, becomes
Rm (xk) =

Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)xk
r+
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)
:
where xk  Rw

lk 1+1

. Therefore, a k-type man wants to marry any women with x 
Rm (xk). In the PSEI, intervals Il; for l = lk 1 + 1; : : : ; l, do not include xk 1. Furthermore,Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw
 
xlk

< 1. From these, Rm (xk)  Rm (xk).
By contrast, a woman with xlk, for l = l(k 1)+1; : : : ; l, accepts a man with xk. Therefore,
men with xk and women with xlk, for l = l(k 1) + 1; : : : ; l, form cluster k. (More formally,
men with xk and women with x 2 [ll=l(k 1)+1[xlk; xl1] form cluster k. However, there are no
women with [xlk 1; x
l
1], for l = l(k 1) + 1; : : : ; l; in the PSEI).
Lemma 6 shows that with constant , if there are su¢ cient k-type women who accept a
k-type man (Rm (xk) > xk+1), a k-type man rejects a k + 1-type woman, for k = 1; : : : ; n.
However, the rejections of k-type men by k-type women with imperfect self-knowledge who
reject him lower his reservation level. As a result, the reservation level of a k-type man is
lower than or equal to theirs under perfect self-knowledge.
The implications of Proposition 3 are as follows: If the economy is at the PSEI, then men
with xk and women with xlk, for lk 1 + 1; : : : ; l; form cluster k, for k = 1; : : : ; n. However,
Cluster 1 is not inuenced by women with imperfect self-knowledge.
The expected duration until the marriage of each agent can be easily obtained. In the
PSE, the duration until the marriage of a k-type agent, i, is 1
jk
(i; j = m;w). In the PSEI,
the duration until the marriage of a k-type man is 1=
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw
 
xlk

, for k = 2; : : : ; n.
Therefore, the marriages of all men, other than those in cluster 1, are delayed by the womens
learning process. For women, the expected duration di¤ers across l; for l = 1; ::; l. The
duration until the next period t of a woman with a;b is
1
b 1k=a
m
k
, for any a < b, and that of
a woman with k;k is
1
mk
, for k = 1; : : : ; n. Therefore, the expected duration until marriage
has its own dynamics over time. Of course, their marriages are delayed by their own learning,
with the exception of cluster 1. Hence, the welfare of each type of agent in the PSEI, other
than those in cluster 1, is lower than that in the PSE.
In a search equilibrium, it is not necessary that the outow of the market equals the
inow. In the next section, we investigate the steady-state equilibrium.
4 Steady state equilibria
Given (Gm; Gw; 0), from Proposition 3, it follows that a search equilibrium generates uniquely
a partition (fRm (xk)gnk=1 ; fRw (l)g
l
l=1). This partition implies a unique type distribution
of exiting agents, Hi (:) ; i = m;w. This partition and N , the number of agents in the market,
also imply the number of agents who exit each state per period, dt. Thus, the number of
agents who exit the market per period is also obtained.
19
To solve for the steady state equilibrium, we must describe how new singles enter the
market over time. In this study, we consider the cloning assumption; if a pair marries
and leaves the market, two identical types of agents enter the market at once.24 Thus,
the distribution of types, Fi (:), i = m;w, is una¤ected by the strategies of agents under
perfect self-knowledge. Therefore, under the cloning assumption and perfect self-knowledge,
given (Fm; Fw; N) ; a search equilibrium implies a steady state equilibrium. The cloning
assumption is the simplest assumption in the inow specications (see, e.g., MacNamara
and Collins (1990), Morgan (1994), Burdett and Coles (2001), Bloch and Ryder (2000), and
Chade (2006)). However, in this paper, any new female entrant does not know her own
type. Hence, the distribution of states, Gw (:) ; is changed by the strategies of agents under
imperfect self-knowledge.
The equilibrium concept for this section is as follows.
Denition 4 Given (Fm; Fw; N), a steady state equilibrium under the cloning assumption is
(Gm; Gw; 0), where
(s-i) the agent strategies are consistent with a search equilibrium; and
(s-ii) for each state xlk, the inow of agents and the outow of agents are balanced.
The steady state requires (s-ii), regardless of the inow specications. As a result of (s-ii),
for each type k, the inow and outow of agents are also balanced. From (s-ii), (Fm; Fw) and
the optimal strategies of agents, given expectations about 0 (or 	w) and (Gm; Gw), together
indeed generate (Gm; Gw; 0) as the steady state distributions of states and the steady state
prior belief.
In the PSEI, all states of 1-type women are x1;bj , for b = 2; : : : ; n. However, there is no
woman with x1;11 because she leaves the market and knows she belongs to the 1-type at the
same time. Hence,
Pn
b=2 
1;b
1 = 1. From (s-ii), the following equation holds.
mb
nX
i=b+1
1;i1 
w
1N = 
b 1X
k=1
mk 
1;b
1 
w
1N; for b = 2; : : : ; n  1: (15)
The LHS of (15) implies that an b-type man changes the state of a woman with x1;i1 ; for
i = b+1; : : : ; n; to x1;b1 by proposing to her. Then, 
m
b dt is the probability in the small time
interval dt that a woman with x1;i1 meets a b-type man and then she learns something about her
type. It follows that the number of women who enter a state x1;b1 is 
m
b
Pn
k=b+1 
1;k
1

w1N .
By contrast,
Pb 1
k=1 
m
k on the RHS of (15) is the share of all men who change the state
of a woman with x1;b1 (i.e., they change her belief or lead her to exit the market). Then,

Pb 1
k=1 
m
k dt is the probability in dt that a woman with x
1;b
1 meets a man, and then she
marries or learns something about her type. Therefore, the number of women who exit a
state x1;b1 is 
Pb 1
k=1 
m
k 
1;b
1 
w
1N .
All sates of j (= 2; : : : ; n)-type women, xa;bj ; are as follows:
24Burdett and Coles (1999) describe four typical inowassumptions.
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x1;jj x
1;j+1
j : : : x
1;n 1
j x
1;n
j
x2;jj x
2;j+1
j : : : x
2;n 1
j x
2;n
j
: : :
xa;jj x
a;j+1
j x
a;b
j x
a;n 1
j x
a;n
j
: : :
xj;jj x
j;j+1
j : : : x
j;n 1
j x
j;n
j :
Here,
Pj
a=1
Pn
b=j 
a;b
j = 1.
From (s-ii), if a < b, an a   1-type man changes the belief of a woman with i;b, for
i = 1; : : : ; a  1; to a;b by rejecting her. Moreover, a b-type man also changes the belief of a
woman with a;i, for i = b+1; : : : ; n; to a;b by proposing to her. It follows that the number
of women who enter a state xa;bj is 
m
a 1
Pa 1
i=1 
i;b
j

wj N + 
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 
a;i
j

wj N . By
contrast,
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k is the share of all men who change the state of a woman with x
a;b
j . It
follows that the number of women who exit a state xa;bj is 
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k 
a;b
j 
w
j N .
If a = b, a = b = j. At this time, a j 1-type man changes the belief of a woman with i;j ,
for i = 1; : : : ; j   1; to j;j by rejecting her. A woman with i;j for i = j + 1; : : : ; n; cannot
be a j;j by learning according to Proposition 2. Thus, the number of women who enter a
state xj;jj is 
m
j 1
Pj 1
k=1 
k;j
j

wj N . By contrast, 
m
j is the share of men who leads her to
exit the market. It follows that the number of women who exit a state xj;jj is 
m
j 
j;j
j 
w
j N .
From these, generally, for any j (= 1; : : : ; n), and any a; b(1  a  j  b  n), the
following equations hold.
ma 1
Pa 1
i=1 
i;b
j

+ mb
Pn
i=b+1 
a;i
j

=
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k

a;bj ; if a < b; (16)
mj 1
Pj 1
i=1 
i;j
j

= mj 
j;j
j ; if a = b (= j) : (17)
where if j = 1, a = j = 1 < b < n:
Given (Gm; Gw; 0), the next lemma holds for the relation between Gw and beliefs at the
steady state. Here, let ij = 	i (xj)   	i (xj 1), where nj=1ij = 1, i = m;w. Lemma 7
shows that the beliefs calculated from Gw (:) are consistent with those calculated by using
Bayes rule. Note that Lemma 7 always holds at the steady state regardless of the inow
specication.
Lemma 7 Given (Gm; Gw; 0), for each state x
a;b
j , j 2 [a; b] ; a;bj is wj appropriately
rescaled. Moreover, the share of women with x0j of women with 0 in the market is equal
to the share of new female j-type entrants, i.e.,
gw(x0j)
nj=1gw(x0j)
= wj , for j = 1; : : : ; n. Hence, the
share of women with xa;bj of women with a;b in the market is equal to the probability a;b (xj)
which is calculated by using Bayesrule, for any a; b (a < b).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 7 shows that the distribution of women with 0 in the market is consistent with
the prior belief of a woman and that the updated beliefs of women, l, are consistent with
21
Gw (:). Lemma 7 also implies that given Gw, which (Fm; Fw) and agentsstrategies generate,
means 0 is also given indirectly.
The next proposition shows that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium, at which
men and women partition themselves into clusters.
Proposition 4 Given (Fm; Fw; N), (Gm; Gw; 0) is uniquely obtained. If (Gm; Gw; 0) sat-
ises (11) and (12), there exists a steady state PSEI.
Given (Gm; Gw), agents strategies and N implies the number of agents who exit the
market per period. Therefore, a unique type distribution of exiting agents is obtained. Under
the cloning assumption, this distribution implies a type distribution of entrants, 	i; i = m;w.
Hence, 0 is obtained.
5 Concluding remarks
In this study, we analyzed one-sided learning in a two-sided search model. Women do not
know their own types; they only learn about their own types from the o¤ers or rejections
they receive from men. As a result of this learning process, the two-sided aspect of the search
problem has generated signicant interest. The main results of this study are as follows. First,
women with imperfect self-knowledge raise or lower their reservation levels in comparison with
the results under perfect self-knowledge. by contrast, some of the reservation levels of men
are lowered if some women with imperfect self-knowledge reject those men who they would
accept under perfect self-knowledge.
Second, the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge is lowered by a
rejection, but never raised by an o¤er. From this result, the reservation level of a woman with
a prior belief is the highest, and her reservation level gradually declines with the duration of
the search. The potential sources of declining reservation wages have received much attention
in the labor market.
There are two possible extensions to this model. First, this study assumes one-sided im-
perfect self-knowledge. From the results, the uncertainty of an agents own type a¤ects his
or her own reservation level. Moreover, the existence of others with imperfect self-knowledge
also a¤ects agentsreservation levels. We can analyze these two inuences on the reservation
level of an agent separately under one-sided imperfect self-knowledge. Two-sided imperfect
self-knowledge (i.e., both men and women initially lack knowledge on their own types) is a
nontrivial extension and causes the analysis to become more complex. The results presented
in this paper suggest that assuming two-sided imperfect self-knowledge implies that the reser-
vation level of any agent is simultaneously a¤ected by two factors: (i) the large share of agents
of the opposite sex who now reject his or her type because of imperfect self-knowledge and
(ii) the uncertainty of his or her own type. The rst element always decreases the agents
reservation level. For the second element, his or her reservation level decreases or increases
relative to the level under perfect self-knowledge.
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Second, this study assumes that there is no divorce. However, when women marry men
before thoroughly understanding their own type, they may learn about their type after they
get married. In this case, the divorce rate is inuenced by the learning that occurs after
marriage.
Finally, we assume agents types are discrete for simplicity. The current results would
apply if agents types are continuous and if n classes of marriages are generated by a suf-
ciently large  under perfect self-knowledge. However, if types are continuous, generally,
the number of womens classes is larger than that of mens classes, which makes the analysis
more complex. Hence, imperfect self-knowledge may generate further changes.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we consider the decision of a 1-type woman. As she is
the highest type, all men propose to her. Hence, "m (x1) = 1 and Fm (:jx1) = Fm (:). From
(1), the expected discounted lifetime utility of an unmarried 1-type woman Vw (x1) ; becomes
rVw (x1) = 
m
1
 
x1
r   Vw (x1)

+
nX
j=2
mj
 
max
xj
r ; Vw (x1)
	  Vw (x1) :
If she meets a 1-type man with probability m1 , they always marry. If a 1-type woman
meets a 2-type man, she compares x2=r with Vw (x1). If she rejects a 2-type man, i.e.,
Vw (x1) >
x2
r , from (1),
rV rw (x1) = 
m
1
 
x1
r   V rw (x1)

:
By contrast, if she accepts a 2-type man and rejects a 3-type man (i.e., x2r  Vw (x1) >
x3
r ),
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rV aw (x1) = 
m
1
 
x1
r   V aw (x1)

+ m2
 
x2
r   V aw (x1)

:
If V rw (x1) > V
a
w (x1), a 1-type woman rejects a 2-type man. This inequality V
r
w (x1) >
V aw (x1) means that
x2 < R

w (x1)  
m
1 x1
m1 +r
< x1:
Conversely, if V rw (x1)  V aw (x1), a 1-type woman accepts a 2-type man. At this time,
x2  Rw (x1) holds.
As the situation is the same for a 1-type man, his reservation match strategy is Rm (x1) 
w1 x1
w1 +r
< x1:
Under x2 < Rw (x1) and x2 < Rm (x1), a 1-type woman proposes to and is accepted by
a 1-type man she encounters. Therefore, 1-type men and 1-type women form a cluster of
marriages (cluster 1).26
If x2 < Rw (x1) and x2 < Rm (x1), we can construct cluster 2. Let us consider all
agents not in cluster 1. Now, a 2-type agent is the highest-type agent. Therefore, the
arrival rate of proposals to a 2-type woman is w (x2) = Fm
 
(x1)
  = Pnj=2 mj , which
is the rate at which she meets men not in cluster 1. The type distribution among such men
implies Fm (:jx2) = Fm (:) =Fm
 
(x1)
 . Therefore, a 2-type womans discounted lifetime
25 If xL=r < Vw (xH)  xM=r, the H- and M -type agents receive at least the same number of o¤ers. Hence,
Vw (xH)  Vw (xM ), and we then have Vw (xM )  xM=r.
26 If agents types are continuous, all women with type xk  Rm (xm) face the same problem because all
men propose to them. Then, they use the same strategy as the highest type women, i.e., Rw (xk) = Rw (xw)
for all xk  Rm (xm). This situation is the same for men in that Rm (xk) = Rm (xm) for all xk  Rw (xw).
As a result, men with xk  Rw (xw) and women with xk  Rm (xm) form class 1.
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utility becomes
rVw (x2) = Fm
 
(x1)
  m2
Fm((x1) )
 
x2
r   Vw (x2)

+
Fm((x1) )
Fm((x1) )
nX
j=3
mj
 
max
xj
r ; Vw (x2)
	  Vw (x2)
= m2
 
x2
r   Vw (x2)

+ 
nX
j=3
mj
 
max
xj
r ; Vw (x2)
	  Vw (x2) :
Consequently, the reservation match strategy of a 2-type woman is
x3 < ()Rw (x2)  
m
2 x2
m2 +r
:
Similarly, the reservation match strategy of a 2-type man is x3 < ()Rm (x2)  
w
2 x2
w2 +r
:
Under Rw (x2) > x3 and Rm (x2) > x3, 2-type men and 2-type women form cluster 2.
Note that although agents in cluster 2 also want to marry agents in cluster 1, they are always
rejected by them.
If Rw (x2) > x3 and Rm (x2) > x3, we can construct a third cluster of marriages (cluster
3) in a similar fashion and so on until for some n, Rw (xn)  
m
n xn
mn +r
x
¯
and Rm (xn) 
wnxn
wn+r
x
¯
.27 Then, n-type men and n-type women form a cluster (cluster n).
Proof of Lemma 1: We prove this lemma by mathematical induction. Let V xkw denotes
the expected discounted utility of a woman who accepts a k-type man. However, V xkw may
not be optimal.
First, we prove that when a = k   1, rV xkw
 
k 1;k

> Rw
 
k;k

holds. The decision of a
woman with k;k whether to accept a k + 1-type man becomes
rVw
 
k;k

= k
xk
r
  Vw
 
k;k

+ k+1

max
nxk+1
r
; Vw
 
k;k
o  Vw  k;k :
Thus, the decision of a woman with k;k depends on whether
xk+1
r exceeds Vw
 
k;k

. From
xk+1 < R

i (xk), Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1:
By contrast, let us consider the decision of a woman with k 1;k whether to accept a k+1-
type man. From w (xj) = ~ni=j
m
i , w (xk 1)   w (xj) = j 1i=k 1mi , and Fm (:jxj) =
F (:)
ni=j
m
i
, for j = k  1; k; the decision of a woman with k 1;k whether to accept a k+ 1-type
man becomes
rV
 
k 1;k

= kj=k 1k 1;k (xj)
"
j 1i=k 1
m
i
 
Rw
 
i+1;k
  Vw  k 1;k+ki=jmi  xir   Vw  k 1;k
+mk+1
 
max
xk+1
r ; Vw
 
k 1;k
	  Vw  k 1;k
#
:
Thus, the decision of a woman with k 1;k depends on whether
xk+1
r exceeds Vw
 
k 1;k

.
27An n-type woman always accepts an n-type man. Otherwise, she cannot marry. Similarly an n-type man
always accepts an n-type woman.
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Noting that Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
,
rVw
 
k 1;k
  rVw  k;k
= rV xkw
 
k 1;k
 Rw  k;k
= 
k 1;k(xk 1)ki=k 1
m
i (xi)+k 1;k(xk)[mk 1(Rw(k;k))+
m
k (xk)]
(r+mk 1+
m
k )
 Rw
 
k;k

=  Rw(k;k)(r+
m
k ) mk xk+(k 1;k(xk 1))mk 1(Rw(k;k) xk 1)
r+mk 1+
m
k
=  (k 1;k(xk 1))
m
k 1(Rw(k;k) xk 1)
r+mk 1+
m
k
:
From xk+1 < Ri (xk), Rw
 
k;k
  xk 1. Hence, rV xkw  k 1;k > Rw  k;k. That
is, given Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1, a woman with k 1;k always rejects a k + 1-type man. The
optimal strategy of a woman with k 1;k always satises Rw
 
k 1;k
  rV xkw  k 1;k. Hence,
Rw
 
k 1;k

> Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1 in an equilibrium.
Let us assume that rV xkw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

, for a = k 1; k 2; ::; l, and l (2  l  1  k).
That is,
V xkw
 
a;k
  Vw  k;k
= 
Pk
j=a a;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(~{+1;k))+
k 1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]+
m
k (
xk
r )
(r+ki=a
m
i )
  Rw(k;k)r
=
r
Pk
j=a ka;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(~{+1;k))+
k 1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
+
rmk (
xk
r ) Rw(k;k)(r+ki=ami )
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
;
Here, noting that 
m
k xk
r+mk
= Rw
 
k;k

and
Pk
j=a a;k (xj) = 1,
V xkw
 
a;k
  Vw  k;k
=
r
Pk
j=a a;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(~{+1;k))+
k 1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
  Rw(k;k)
k 1
i=a 
m
i
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
= 
Pk
j=a a;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (rVw(~{+1;k) Rw(k;k))+k 1i=j mi (xi Rw(k;k))]
(r+ki=a
m
i )r
> 0;
holds. From this, Rw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

also holds. Given these, let us investigate the
case of a = l   1. At this time,
rV xkw
 
l 1;k
 R  k;k
= 
Pk
j=l 1 l 1;k(xj)[
j 1
i=l 1
m
i (rVw(~{+1;k) Rw(k;k))+k 1i=j mi (xi Rw(k;k))]
(r+ki=l 1
m
i )r
:
From Rw
 
k;k
  xk, k 1i=j mi  xi  Rw  k;k > 0. Moreover, from Rw  a;k > Rw  k;k,
for a = k   1; k   2; : : : l, (2  l  1  k), we have V xkw
 
l 1;k

> V
 
k;k

: Therefore,
Rw
 
l 1;k

> Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1.
From these results, rV xkw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

, for any a (1  a < k) :
Proof of Lemma 2: Let V xkw denotes the expected discounted utility of a woman who
accepts a k-type man, for any k 2 (a; b].28. However, V xkw may not be optimal.
From w (xj) = ~ni=j
m
i , w (xa)   w (xj) = j 1i=ami , and Fm (:jxj) = F (:)ni=jmi , the
28A woman with a;b, for a  b; always accepts an a-type man.
27
decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type man, for any k 2 (a; b], becomes
rVw
 
a;b

= 
kX
j=a
a;b (xj)
266664
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b
  Vw  a;b
+k 1i=j 
m
i
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;b

+mk
 
max

xk
r ; V
xk 1
w
 
a;k
	  Vw  a;b
+b 1i=k+1
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
  Vw  a;b
377775
+
bX
j=k+1
a;b (xj)
"
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b
  Vw  a;b
+b 1i=j 
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
  Vw  a;b
#
: (18)
From (18), if she accepts a k-type man,
V xkw
 
a;b

=
0@ Pkj=a a;b (xj) hj 1i=ami  Vw  i+1;b+ki=jmi  xir +b 1i=k+1mi  Vw  a;ii
+
Pb
j=k+1 a;b (xj)
h
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b

+b 1i=j 
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
i
1A
r + b 1i=a
m
i
:
If she rejects him,
V
xk 1
w
 
a;b

=
0BB@ 
Pk
j=a a;b (xj)
h
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b

+k 1i=j 
m
i
 
xi
r

+b 1i=k
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
i
+
Pb
j=k+1 a;b (xj)
h
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b

+b 1i=j 
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
i
1CCA
r+b 1i=a
m
i
:
Hence,
V xkw
 
a;b
  V xk 1w  a;b = Pkj=a a;b(xj)mk hxkr  V xk 1w (a;k)i(r+b 1i=ami ) :
From this,
V xkw
 
a;b

< ()V xk 1w
 
a;b
, xk < () rV xk 1w  a;k = Rw  a;b :
That is, the decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type man depends on
whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

. From this, given xk0 < Rw
 
a;b

, equilibrium requires that
rV
xk 1
w
 
a;k
  xk, for k = a+1; : : : ; k0 1, and xk < rV xk 1w  a;k, for k = k0; : : : ; n, holds.
Next, given xk0 < Rw
 
a;b

, let us investigate the best strategy of a woman with a;k0
because V xk 1w
 
a;k

may not be optimal. Her decision whether to accept a k0   1-type man
becomes
rVw
 
a;k0

= 
k0X
j=a
a;k0 (xj)
2664
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;k0
  Vw  a;k0
+k
0 2
i=j 
m
i
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;k0

+mk0 1

max
n
xk0 1
r ; V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1
o  Vw  a;k0
3775 :
Therefore, her decision depends on whether
xk0 1
r exceeds V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1

. Because xk 
rV
xk 1
w
 
a;k

, for k = a + 1; : : : ; k0   1, holds, xk0 1  rV xk0 2w
 
a;k0 1

. Hence, the best
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strategy of a woman with a;k0 is Rw
 
a;k0

= rV
xk0 1
w
 
a;k0

> xk0 . Then, we have
Rw
 
a;b

= Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 :
Next, let us investigate the decision of a woman with a;k0+1, for k
0 + 1  b. Similar
to a woman with a;k0 , the decision of a woman with a;k0+1 whether to accept a k
0-type
man also depends on whether xk0r exceeds V
xk0 1
w
 
a;k0

. Given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 ,
xk
r <
V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

; k = k0; : : : ; b; holds. Therefore, she reject a k0-type man at least. Moreover,
the decision of a woman with a;k0+1 whether to accept a k
0   1-type man also depends
on whether
xk0 1
r exceeds V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1

. Given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 ,
xk
r  V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

, for
k = a; : : : ; k0   1; holds. Hence, xk0 1r  V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1

. From these results, Rw
 
a;k0+1

=
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 .
By repeating the same procedure until the decision of a woman with a;b 1, we obtain
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b 1

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 :
If Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 , a woman with a;b+l, for any l > 0; also rejects a k
0-type man. This is
because her decision depends on whether whether xk0r exceeds V
xk0 1
w
 
a;k0

. Hence,
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b

= : : : = Rw
 
a;n

> xk0 :
Conversely, given Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 , xk  rV xk 1w
 
a;k

, for k = a + 1; : : : ; k0   1. From
this, a woman with a;b also rejects a k
0-type man. Moreover, a woman with a;b rejects a
k0+1-type or lower type man from the reservation property. Hence, if Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 , then
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 for any b  k0. In other words, given Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 , we have
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;n

> xk0 :

Proof of Lemma 3: We prove the lemma by mathematical induction. First, we inves-
tigate the case where l = 0;for any a = 1; : : : ; n 1. From Ri (xk) > xk+1, a woman with a;a
always rejects an a + 1-type man, i.e., Rw
 
a;a

= 
m
a xa
ma +r
> xa+1. If a woman with a;a+1
also rejects a a+ 1-type man, her value becomes
rV xaw
 
a;a+1

= r
a;a+1(xa)
m
a (
xa
r )+(1 a;a+1(xa))ma (Vw(a+1;a+1))
r+ma
. From these
Rw
 
a;a
  rV xaw  a;a+1 = ma  1  a;a+1 (xa) xa rVw(a+1;a+1)r+ma
From rVw
 
a+1;a+1
  xa+1 < xa, Rw  a;a > rV xaw  a;a+1 :
From Lemma 1, a woman with a;a+1 always rejects a a + 2-type man. Moreover, she
always accepts a a-type man. From these, we have
Rw
 
a;a
  Rw  a;a+1 : (19)
Next, we investigate the case of l = 1 for any a = 1; : : : ; n  2. To simplify the notation,
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pj = a;a+1 (xj) and qj = a;a+2 (xj) : If a woman with a;a+2 rejects an a+ 1-type man, her
decision depends on whether xa+1r exceeds V
xa
w
 
a;a+1

. At this time,
V xaw
 
a;a+1

= V xaw
 
a;a+2

: (20)
If a woman with a;a+1 rejects a a+ 2-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+1

=

Pa+1
j=a pjVw(xj ja;a+1)
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
=

Pa+1
j=a pj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+1))+
a+1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
:
Similarly, when a woman with a;a+2 rejects an a+ 2-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+2

=

Pa+1
j=a qjVw(xj ja;a+2)
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
=

Pa+1
j=a qj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+2))+
a+1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]+qa+2[
a+1
i=a 
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+2))]
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
.
Moreover, from (3), pj =
qj
qa+qa+1
, for j = a; a+ 1. Therefore,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+1
  V xa+1w  a;a+2
= 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
2664
qa
qa+qa+1
Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  qaVw  xaja;a+2
+ qa+1qa+qa+1Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
  qa+qa+1qa+qa+1 (1  (qa + qa+1))Vw
 
xa+2ja;a+2

3775
= 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
26666664
qaVw(xaja;a+1)
qa+qa+1
  qaVw
 
xaja;a+2

  qa(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xa+2ja;a+2)qa+qa+1
+
qa+1Vw(xa+1ja;a+1)
qa+qa+1
  qa+1Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+2

  qa+1(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xa+2ja;a+2)qa+qa+1
37777775
Here, from Vw
 
x00ja;b
  Vw  x0ja;b ; for any a; b (a < b) ; and x00 > x0,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+1
  V xa+1w  a;a+2
 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
2666664
qa
qa+qa+1
Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  qaVw  xaja;a+2
  qa(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xaja;a+2)qa+qa+1
+ qa+1qa+qa+1Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
  qa+1(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xaja;a+2)qa+qa+1
3777775
= 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
"
qa
qa+qa+1
 
Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  Vw  xaja;a+2
+ qa+1qa+qa+1
 
Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
#
Here, Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  Vw  xaja;a+2 = a+1i=ami  xir   a+1i=ami  xir  = 0. Moreover,
Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
= ma Vw
 
a+1;a+1

+ ma+1
xa+1
r  

ma Vw
 
a+1;a+2

+ ma+1
xa+1
r

= ma

Vw
 
a+1;a+1
  Vw  a+1;a+2
From (19), for any a, Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+2. From these, we have
V xa+1w
 
a;a+1
  V xa+1w  a;a+2 : (21)
From (20)-(21), in an equilibrium,
Rw
 
a;a+1
  Rw  a;a+2 ; (22)
must hold. Specically, if a woman with a;a+2 rejects an a + 3-type man, Rw
 
a;a+1

>
xa+2  R
 
a;a+2

.
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Let assume that Rw
 
i;a+l 1

> Rw
 
i;a+l

, for l = l   1 and a = 1; : : : ; n   l, and for
i = a; a+ 1; : : : ; a+ l   1.
Given this, let us investigate the case of l = l. If a woman with a;a+l rejects an s-type
man, for s = a + 1; : : : ; a + l   1, her decision depends on whether xsr exceeds V
xs 1
w
 
a;s

.
Similarly, if a woman with a;a+l+1 rejects an s-type man, for s = a + 1; : : : ; a + l   1, her
decision also depends on whether xsr exceeds V
xs 1
w
 
a;s

. Therefore, for s = a+1; : : : ; a+l 1,
V xsw
 
a;a+l

= V xsw
 
a;a+l+1

: (23)
If a woman with a;a+l rejects a a+ l-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l

=

Pa+l
j=a pj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+l))+
a+l
i=j
m
i (
xi
r )]
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
:
Similarly, when a woman with a;a+l+1 rejects an a+ l-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l+1

=

Pa+l
j=a qj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+l+1))+
a+l
i=j
m
i (
xi
r )]+qa+l+1[
a+l
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+l+1))]
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
.
Moreover, from (3), pj =
qj
(qa+:::+qa+l)
, for j = a; a+ 1; : : : ; a+ l. Therefore,
V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l
  V xa+lw  a;a+l+1
= 
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
26666666666664
qa
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  qaVw  xaja;a+l+1
  qa(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+l+1ja;a+l+1

+ qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l)Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
  qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+l+1ja;a+l+1

+ : : : :
+
qa+l
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  qa+lVw  xa+lja;a+l+1
  qa+l(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+l+1ja;a+l+1

37777777777775
 
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
26666666666664
qa
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  qaVw  xaja;a+l+1
  qa(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xaja;a+l+1

+ qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l)Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
  qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l+1

+ : : : :
+
qa+l
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  qa+lVw  xa+lja;a+l+1
  qa+l(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l+1

37777777777775
= 
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
266664
qa
(qa+:::+qa+l)

Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  Vw  xaja;a+l+1
+ qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l)

Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
+ : : :
+
pa+l
(qa+:::+qa+l)

Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  Vw  xa+lja;a+l+1
377775
Here, Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  Vw  xaja;a+l+1 = a+li=ami  xir   a+li=ami  xir  = 0.
Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
=
h
ma
 
Vw
 
a+1;a+l

+a+li=a+1
m
i
 
xi
r
i  hma  Vw  a+1;a+l+1+a+li=a+1mi  xir i
= ma
 
Vw
 
a+1;a+l
  Vw  a+1;a+l+1 :
...
Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  Vw  xa+lja;a+l+1
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=
h
a+l 1i=a 
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;a+l

+ ma+l
 
xi
r
i  ha+l 1i=a mi  Vw  i+1;a+l+1+ ma+l  xir i
= a+l 1i=a 
m
i
  
Vw
 
i+1;k
   Vw  i+1;k+1
= ma
 
Vw
 
a+1;a+l
  Vw  a+1;a+l+1
+ma+1
 
Vw
 
a+2;a+l
   Vw  a+2;a+l+1
+ : : :
+mk 1
 
Vw
 
a+l;a+l
  Vw  a+l;a+l+1 :
From the assumption of mathematical induction, Vw
 
i;a+l
   Vw  i;a+l+1 > 0,for i =
a+ 1; : : : ; a+ l; holds. Therefore, V xa+lw
 
a;a+l

> V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l+1

. From this and (23)
Rw
 
a;a+l+1
  Rw  a;a+l :

Proof of Lemma 4: From Lemma 2, the decision of a woman with a;b, for any
a; b (a < b), whether to accept a k-type man depends on whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

,
for k 2 (a+ 1; b). Similarly, the decision of a woman with a+1;k whether to accept a k-type
man depends on whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a+1;k

, for k 2 (a+ 1; b). Here,
V
xk 1
w
 
a;k
  V xk 1w  a+1;k
= 
(r+k 1i=a 
m
i )
0BBBBBBB@
pa
m
a
 
xa
r

+ (1  pa)ma Vw
 
a+1;k

+

a+1j=apj

ma+1
 xa+1
r

+

1  a+1j=apj

ma+1Vw
 
a+2;k

+

a+2j=apj

ma+2
 xa+2
r

+

1 

a+2j=apj

ma+2Vw
 
a+3;k

+ : : :
+(1  pk)mk 1
 xk 1
r

+ pk
m
k 1Vw
 
k;k

1CCCCCCCA
  
(r+k 1i=a 
m
i )
0BBBBBBBB@
ma Vw
 
a+1;k

+

pa+1
1 pa

ma+1
 xa+1
r

+

1 

pa+1
1 pa

ma+1Vw
 
a+2;k

+

a+2j=a+1
pj
1 pa

ma+2
 xa+2
r

+

1 

a+2j=a+1
pj
1 pa

ma+2Vw
 
a+3;k

+ : : :
+

1  pk(1 pa)

mk 1
 xk 1
r

+ pk(1 pa)
m
k 1Vw
 
k;k

1CCCCCCCCA
= 
(r+k 1i=a 
m
i )
0BBBBBBBB@
ma pa
xa rVw(a+1;k)
r
+ma+1pa (1  (pa + pa+1))
xa+1 rVw(a+2;k)
r(1 pa)
+ma+2pa (1  (pa + pa+1 + pa+2))
xa+2 rVw(a+3;k)
r(1 pa)
+ : : :
+mk 1papk
xk 1 rVw(k;k)
r(1 pa)
1CCCCCCCCA
:
From xi  Rw
 
i;k

, for i = a + 1; : : : ; k, xi 1 > rVw
 
i;k

. Hence, V xk 1w
 
a;k

>
V
xk 1
w
 
a+1;k

, for any k (< a+ 1).
Given xk < Rw
 
a+1;b

, for k 2 (a+ 1; b), xk < Rw
 
a+1;k

= Rw
 
a+1;b

, from Lemma
2. From V xk 1w
 
a;k

> V
xk 1
w
 
a+1;k

= Rw
 
a+1;k

> xk,
xk < Rw
 
a+1;k

= Rw
 
a+1;b

< rV
xk 1
w
 
a;k
  Rw  a;k. However, when xk <
Rw
 
a;k

, Rw
 
a;k

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk from Lemma 2. Therefore, for any k 2 (a+ 1; b),
xk < Rw
 
a+1;b

= Rw
 
a+1;k

< Rw
 
a;k

= Rw
 
a;b

:
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Proof of Proposition 2: Given Rw (0) > xk+1; there are no women with 1;i, for
i = 1; : : : ; k, in the market.29 Furthermore, from Lemma 2
xk  Rw
 
1;k+1

= Rw
 
1;k+2

= : : : = Rw
 
1;n 1

= Rw (0) > xk+1 (24)
holds. From this, even if a woman with 0 updates her belief to 1;i; for any i 2 fk+1; ::; n 1g,
after a meeting, then her reservation level does not rise.
A woman with 1;i, for i = k + 1; : : : ; n; becomes a woman with a;i if she is rejected by
an a  1-type man, for any a > 1. From Lemma 4, Rw
 
1;i

> Rw
 
a;i

.
For any a; b(1 < a  k < b); given Rw
 
a;b

> xk+1;
xk  Rw
 
a;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b 1

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk+1
holds from Lemma 2. Therefore, if a woman with a;b updates her belief to a;i; for any
i 2 fk+1; ::; b  1g, then her reservation level does not rise. Furthermore, a woman with a;b
cannot be a woman with a;i, for any i 2 fa; : : : ; kg, who has a higher reservation level than
that of a woman with a;b. This is because a woman with a;b always accepts a k-type man.
By contrast, a woman with a;b becomes a woman with a0;b if she is rejected by an
a0   1-type man, for any a0 > a. From Lemma 4, Rw
 
a;b

> Rw
 
a0;b

. Hence, she revises
her reservation level downward.
From these results, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise her reservation
level in search.
Finally, we show that Rw (0) is the highest reservation level of women in equilibrium.
Given Rw (0) > xk+1; (24) holds. Let us assume that there is a woman with a;k0 , who
has her reservation level such that Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0  xk, for any a; k0 (1 < a < k0  k).
A woman with 1;i, for i = k + 1; : : : ; n; becomes a woman with a;i if she is rejected by
an a   1-type man. Similarly, a woman with a0;i, for a0 (1 < a0 < a), and i = k + 1; : : : ; n;
becomes a woman with a;i if she is rejected by an a   1-type man. Here, a woman with
a;i; i = k + 1; : : : ; n; becomes a woman with a;k0 if she rejects a k
0-type man who proposes
to her. However, Rw
 
1;i

> Rw
 
a;i

. Then, xk  Rw
 
a;i

, for i = k+1; : : : ; n, from (24).
This contradicts the fact that there is a woman with a;k0 who has Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0  xk.
Thus, there are no such women in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7: Given 	w (:), 0 consists of 0 (xj) = wj , for j = 1; : : : ; n. Accord-
ing to Bayesrule, a belief a;b (xj), for any a; b; j (1  a  j  b  n), becomes a;b (xj) =
j
bj=aj
.
By contrast, let us derive beliefs a;b (xj) from Gw (:) and then, conrm these beliefs are
consistent with those calculated by using Bayesrule. For this, let us investigate the balanced
ow in all states. Let 0j = 
1;n
j . All states of a woman with x
a;b
j for any j are as follows.
29 If there was a woman with 1;i, for i  k, she would reject an i-type man in her past. In this case, a
woman with 0 must reject an i-type man from Lemma 2.
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x1;jj x
1;j+1
j : : : x
1;n 1
j x
1;n
j
x2;jj x
2;j+1
j : : : x
2;n 1
j x
2;n
j
: : :
xa;jj x
a;j+1
j x
a;b
j x
a;n 1
j x
a;n
j
: : :
xj;jj x
j;j+1
j : : : x
j;n 1
j x
j;n
j :
Given wj and , for the state x
1;n
j = x
0
j , the balanced ow is satised if and only if
wj = 
n 1X
k=1
mk 
0
j
w
j N: (25)
where wj  is the inow of new female entrants with xj .
30 From (25), 0j = 
w
j =
Pn 1
k=1 
m
k 
w
j N:
Then, let us investigate the balanced ow in the state xa;bj , for any j = 1; : : : ; n.
For a = 1 and b = n  1, (i.e., x1;n 1j ); from (16),
1;n 1j =
mn 1Pn 2
k=1 
m
k
01 = A1;n 1
0
j ;
where A1;n 1 = mn 1=
Pn 2
k=1 
m
k is the coe¢ cient of 
0
j . Then, for a = 1 and b = n   2, we
have
1;n 2j =
mn 2(
1;n 1
1 +
1;n
1 )Pn 3
k=1 
m
k
=
mn 2(A1;n 1+1)Pn 3
k=1 
m
k
0j = A1;n 2
0
j
where A1;n 2 = mn 2 (A1;n 1 + 1) =
Pn 3
k=1 
m
k

. We can recursively repeat the same proce-
dure until b = j: Therefore, for a = 1; and b = j; : : : ; n; we have
1;bj =
mb

1;b+1j +
1;b+2
j +:::+
1;n
j

Pb 1
k=1 
m
k
=
mb (A1;b+1+A1;b+2+:::+A1;n 2+A1;n)Pb 1
k=1 
m
k
01 = A1;b
0
j : (26a)
where A1;n = 1. However, if j = 1, all states of a woman with x1 are x
1;2
1 ; : : : ; x
1;n
1 ; because
there are no women with 1;1 in equilibrium. Hence, a = j = 1 < b:
Similarly, for a = 2, b = j; : : : ; n, and a < j  b or a = j = 2 < b, we have
2;bj =
m1 
1;b
j +
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 
2;i
jPb 1
k=2 
m
k
=
m1 A1;b+
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 A2;iPb 1
k=2 
m
k
0j = A2;b
0
j :
If a = b = j = 2,
2;22 =
m1 
1;2
2
m2
=
m1 A1;2
0
2
m2
;
from (17) and (26a).
The same procedure is repeatedly applied until a = j. Therefore, generally, for a < j  b
30Under the cloning assumption, wj and  are endogenous, whereas they are exogenous under the exogenous
inow assumption.
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or a = j < b; (j = 1; : : : ; n); we can rewrite a;bj as
a;bj =
ma 1

1;bj +
2;b
j +:::+
a 1;b
j

+mb

a;b+1j +
a;b+2
j :::+
a;n
j

(
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k )
=
ma 1
Pa 1
i=1 Ai;b+
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 Aa;iPb 1
k=a 
m
k
0j = Aa;b
0
j : (27)
For a = j = b, (j = 2; : : : ; n), from (17), we have j;jj =
mj 1(
1;j
j +
2;j
j +:::+
j 1;j
j )
mj
: From
(27), a;jj = Aa;j
0
j , for a = 1; : : : ; j   1. Hence,
j;jj =
mj 1
Pj 1
i=1 Ai;j
mj
0j = Aj;j
0
j : (28)
From (25), (27) can be rewritten as
a;bj = Aa;b
wj

Pn 1
k=1 
m
k 
w
j N
; (29)
Hence, from (25) and (29), noting that Aa;b depends only on Fm (:), we have
0 (xj) =
gw(x0j)
nk=1gw(x
0
j)
=
0j
w
j
nj=1
0
j
w
j
=
wj
nj=1
w
j
= wj ;
and
a;b (xj) =
gw

xa;bj

bj=agw

xa;bj
 = a;bj wj
nj=1
a;b
j 
w
j
=
Aa;b
0
j
w
jPb
j=a Aa;b
0
j
w
j
=
wjPb
j=a 
w
j
:
These equal to 0 (xk) and a;b (xj), which are calculated by using Bayesrule. Hence,
beliefs a;b (xj) are consistent with distribution Gw (:) in the steady state equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: Now, Gm = Fm holds.
First, let us consider the case of j = 1. In the PSEI,
Pn
b=2 
1;b
1 = 1. Let 
1;n
1 = 
0
1 =
1  Pn 1b=2 1;b1 . Therefore, the number of unknown variables, 1;b1 , for b = 2; : : : :; n   1; is
n  2. By contrast, from (15), the number of equations is n  2, which becomes equal to the
number of unknown variables, 1;b1 :
Next, let us consider the case of j = 2; : : : ; n: From
Pj
a=1
Pn
b=j 
a;b
j = 1, let 
1;n
j =
0j = 1  
Pn 1
b=j 
1;b
j  
Pj
a=2
Pn
b=j 
a;b
j . Hence, the number of unknown variables, 
a;j
j , is
j (n  (j   1))  1. By contrast, from (16)-(17), the number of equations is j (n  (j   1)) 
1 because a woman cannot become x0j = x
1;n
j from the other states. Therefore, the number
of equations becomes equal to the number of unknown variables.
From these results and Lemma 7, for any j = 1; : : : ; n; the system has a unique solution,
(Gw; 0).
From these results, given any (Fm; Fw; N), (Gm; Gw; 0) is always uniquely obtained. If
(Gm; Gw; 0) satises (11) and (12), there exists a steady state PSEI.
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